Evidence at Sentancing Must Go to 'How,' Not 'Whether'

Oregon v. Guzek

Guzek was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. For an alibi Guzek brought his mother and his grandfather, who both testified that he had been with “one or the other at the time of the crime.” On appeal the Oregon Supreme Court ordered a new sentencing trial, and finding procedural violations at each, ordered subsequent sentencing trials. Here, the Court addresses three arguments that Guzek puts forth to the effect that he is entitled to introduce new evidence, in the form of testimony by his mother and grandfather, showing that he was not at the scene of the crime.

The Court first addresses the question of whether or not it has proper jurisdiction. Guzek argues that state law provides him with the right to introduce live testimony. Oregon law allows him to introduce “evidence … relevant to [the] sentence including … mitigating evidence relevant to … [w]hether the defendant should receive the death sentence,” which the Oregon Supreme Court held to be limited to the evidence the Federal Constitution grants Guzek a right to introduce. Since the Oregon court decided that this live testimony was required by the constitution (in Green v. Georgia), the Court here finds proper jurisdiction over a case decided on federal grounds. Additionally, the state law that allows Guzek to recall witnesses called at trial to introduce relevant evidence was found to allow his mother’s live testimony only for the federal definition of ‘relevance.’

The Court characterizes the evidence that Guzek wants to introduce new, inconsistent with his prior conviction, and shedding no light on the manner in which the crime was committed. The Court describes the precedents on which the Oregon court relied, statements such as those requiring that the sentencer be able to consider “any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers” as evidence regarding “how, not whether.” The three circumstances that convince the Court that the State can preclude the evidence are 1) this evidence goes to whether the crime was committed, not how, 2) “the parties previously litigated the issue to which the evidence is relevant … the evidence thereby attacks a previously determined matter,” and 3) the negative impact of the rule is mitigated by the fact that all previous evidence from the trial can be introduced in transcript form. The effect: evidence at sentancing should not be used to introduce residual doubt.

Scalia and Thomas write separately to state that the third circumstance is inconsistent with the first two, and should be left out.