Meaning of “Negligent Transmission” and Sovereign Immunity

Dolan v. Postal Service

The U.S Postal Service waives the sovereign immunity it retains as a governmental agency under the executive branch in cases of "injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,” but excludes “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” Barbra Dolan is suing USPS because she tripped over letters or a package that were negligently placed at her door. The question in this case is whether the previous exclusion applies.

The Court concludes that “context and precedent require a narrow reading of “negligent transmission,” restricting its meaning to negligence causing mail to be lost or arrive late, damaged, or to the wrong place. That “negligent transmission” is followed by the terms “loss” and “miscarriage” the Court argues indicates that “negligent transmission” should be limited to “failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner to the right address.

Previously, in Kosak, the Court held that when trying to waive immunity as to injuries resulting from auto accidents where USPS employees were at fault “the draftsmen of the provision carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which the Government was not assuming financial responsibility … excluding, by implication, negligent handling of motor vehicles.” The majority, here, sees no difference in the distinction between transmission and postal-car accidents and the distinction applied in this case. Also, those instances where immunity is retained are, and were when the law was written, somewhat delineated by those instances covered by postal insurance.

Justice Thomas, in dissent, argues that the meaning of the word transmit, and the meaning it carries throughout other statutes, includes the final delivery. Justice Thomas rejects the idea that the rule of noscitur a sociis (a word is known by the company it keeps) requires a more limited construction of “transmission” because neither “loss” nor “miscarriage” carry that requirement, and argues that the appeal to legislative intent in the Kosak was a direct appeal to intended statutory purpose in that case, not an appeal to principle. Thomas also argues that Kosak was concerned with acts, not consequences (as the majority tended to imply), and that the Government was due a strict construction in favor of the sovereign.