Standard of Review for Preemptory Challenges
In this case Collins appeals from a conviction, arguing that the prosecutor based a preemptory challenge on an unconstitutional factor; race. The race-neutral reason proffered by the prosecutor was that Juror 16 rolled her eyes in response to a question; that she was young and “might be too tolerant of drug crime;” and that she was “single and lacked ties to the community.” The prosecutor also relied on gender, which was disallowed by the trial court. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding it was unreasonable to accept the prosecutor’s explanation.
The standard of review follows three steps (1) the defendant is required to make a prima facie showing that the preemptory challenge was based on race; (2) the prosecutor must then offer a race-neutral explanation; at which point (3) the court must “determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination,” with the burden resting on the challenger. The Ninth Circuit relied (in addition to the fact that the trial court had not witnessed the eye rolling) on the fact that the prosecutor’s erroneous statements about the jurors’ age, the prosecutor’s attempt to use gender as a basis, and skepticism about whether youth and lack of ties to the community were genuine reasons.
The Court here suggested that the first reason could be explained by a simple misstatement, that the improper basis in gender was not sufficient to overturn, and that the third reason could be accepted, and at the very least, it was not unreasonable to do so.
In a concurrence, Justices Breyer and Souter argue that preemptory challenges are often based more on instinct that reason, and that the system is inherently flawed as to their review. They also argue that “legal life without peremptories [sic] is no longer unthinkable” and that the framework should be revisited.
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home