Article 1 vs. 11th Amendment: Sovereign Immunity

Central Va. Community College v. Katz

The Constitution grants Congress the power to create “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” This case addresses the question as to whether Congress attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases in the US Code is valid in light of Art. 1 Sec. 4 Cl. 8, and the 11th Amendment, and thereby give the bankruptcy court jurisdiction in this case. This case is also about “preferential treatments,” a concept with which I am entirely unfamiliar, so I left it alone.

The majority starts off by observing that “bankruptcy jurisdiction, at its core, is in rem,” (which seems to mean that the court’s jurisdiction is satisfied solely by the person, such as Habeas Corpus cases) a fact that is reasserted throughout the opinion to demonstrate that such “in rem” cases do not implicate state sovereign immunity. After distinguishing a precedent, the opinion then delves into the history of the clause since the framing. The opinion discusses how bankruptcy laws began when individual states would “discharge” bankrupt persons from jail, and how, were this to happen in England the debtor would be free, whereas in America, the debtor was subject to later imprisonment in another jurisdiction. Then, during the framing, citizens were granted the right of Habeas Corpus in connection with bankruptcy cases, 67 years before they would enjoy the right generally (14th Amendment).

In regards to the 11th Amendment, which the Court observes was passed in response to outrage over injustices arising from the treatment of bankruptcy cases, and declares that the amendment stands “not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure it confirms.” Thus the Court reaches the implication that the understanding of Art. 1 Sec. 4 Cl. 8, at the time of the 11th Amendment, included the proposition that States were “not to assert any sovereign immunity defense thy might have had in proceedings brought pursuant to “Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.’” Therefore, “the relevant ‘abrogation’ is the one effected in the plan of the Convention, not by statute.’

The dissent rejects the notion that this decision can stand without explicitly overruling prior cases (Hoffman). The dissent characterizes the 11th Amendment as the rejection of Chisholm v. Georgia (the ruling of which is not set out in the opinion except to indicate that it somehow elucidates the phrase “Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the [constitutional] convention, it will remain with the states”). Mostly, the dissent argues that it is illogical to say that one clause of Article 1 abrogates state sovereign immunity where none of the others do. This seems to be an apples:oranges comparison, or rest on a property attributed to a group (Article 1) from a set of particulars (the other clauses/sections of Article 1), or simply beg the question. However, without researching Seminole I can’t really make any of those claims. On the other hand, the dissent suggests that sovereign power to enact law (given up in Art. 1), and sovereign immunity from private suit (retained in the 11th Am.) need not run together. The dissent argues that the majority’s Habeas Corpus arguments have no bearing on the case at hand, that uniform laws have nothing to do with sovereign immunity, and that whether bankruptcy cases are generally in rem is not conclusive of the question in this case.

“It would be one thing if the majority simply wanted to overrule Seminole Tribe altogether. That would be wrong, but at least the terms of our disagreement would be transparent.” (Justice Thomas)

P.S: I don't think I really understood this one.