Can a Condition Alter the Proposition to Which It is Attached?

Dodd v. United States

Michael Dodd was convicted on multiple counts of drug possession as well as a charge of "engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise." More than a year before his conviction the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. United States that to be convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise the jury had to agree unanimously to the convictions of each of the charges constituting that enterprise, an instruction that was not given to the jury in Dodd's trial. For this reason Dodd filed a motion on April 4, 2001, to vacate his conviction. The applicable one year period in which Dodd could file such a motion began “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” The Court in this case must determine whether the one year limitation began on August 6, 1997 (the date his conviction became final), or on April 19, 2002 (The day that the courts recognized in Ross v. United States, that the right should apply retroactively).

Dodd argues that the right must be (1) recognized by the Court, (2) be newly recognized, and (3) be made retroactive in order to fulfill the prerequisites of the law. Appealing to the 'clear language of the law' the majority here holds that the only date referred to in the text is the date on which the right is first recognized and that the requirement that it be retroactively applicable is only a limiting condition. Essentially the Court is holding that in the proposition "A if B and C" A cannot be altered by condition B or C except to be made true or false.

The dissent argues that the alternate reading is more natural, and squares with the law because it begins the time limit at the point at which the new right is actually available. The dissent objects by arguing that it is nonsensical for Congress to set the length of the one year period, at one year minus whatever interval has gone by after the right has been recognized and until it has been made retroactive, when it is perfectly possible that that interval could be a year or more. Justice Stevens suggests that this dilemma arises out of a Congress' assumption that a right's retroactive application is established at the same time that he right is recognized. Thus, he appeals to the statement in Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States that “Congress generally drafts statutes of limitations to begin when the cause of action accrues" while the majority distinguishes the Graham County case stating that the law in that case was additionally ambiguous.

A second dissent by Justice Ginsburg builds on Justice Stevens' argument that in this case, for many defendants, their ability to avail themselves of a new right would be effectively nullified. Justice Ginsburg's dissent closes by stating that "it exalts form over reality to equate" this case with Graham County because in the latter case a six year period of limitation is unlikely to (and in fact never has) prevented a defendant from bringing an action under a new right, whereas in that is the result of this case, and is a result that is likely to be repeated.