What Happens When the State Makes Two Contradictory Arguments?

Bradshaw v. Stumpf

Three men, Stumpf, Wesley and Edmonds, were driving down the highway in Ohio and decided that they needed gas money. So they pulled over and Stumpf and Wesley got some people to let them into their house by asking to use the phone. They then held the two at gunpoint while they robbed them. The man was shot and blacked out, and when he awoke he heard the shots that killed his wife. Stumpf admitted to shooting the man but has, from day one, denied shooting the woman. In a plea bargain, and while Wesley was fighting extradition to Ohio, Stumpf agreed to plead guilty to one count of aggravated murder, and one count of attempted aggravate murder. To secure the death penalty the prosecutor argued that Stumpf had been the principle participant in the robbery and murder. Then in Wesley's trial it became clear that he had fired the shots that killed the woman. Furthermore, the prosecutor argued that Wesley had been the principle participant, in opposition to his argument in Stumpf's trial. The District Court reversed a lower court's denial of habeas corpus on the grounds that (1) Stumpf must have entered his plea unknowingly because the "aggravated murder" charge includes acts that Stumpf has denied from the beginning, and (2) Stumpf's due process rights were violated by the contradictory approach of the prosecutor. Note: The Court here is applying the law pre 1996 AEDPA (aka: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act; aka: Bill Clinton's Patriot Act).

The first reason that the District Court gives for granting habeas corpus is that Stumpf was not aware of what his guilty plea entailed. A guilty plea is valid only if it is given "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." However, courts are very careful to make a record of the fact that defendants understand what they are agreeing to, and the lower court did so in this case, and the Court declined to hold that the lower court judge himself must read the provisions to the defendant. What's more, under Ohio law, the fact that Stumpf did not shoot the woman does not disqualify him from the aggravated murder charge, as alders and abettors are also eligible. Also, the Court found that any ambiguities in the record about Stumpf's plea only indicate anticipation for the mitigation hearings, and that the fact that the plea agreement was a bad deal could only be attacked by arguing that he had ineffective assistance of counsel, which is not the question in this case. The Court thus reversed the District Court's first reason for granting habeas corpus. Because, again, in Ohio the fact that Stumpf did not shoot the woman does not disqualify him from the aggravated murder charge, and because the prosecutor's contradictory arguments were not shown to have in any way affected Stumpf's plea, the second reason for the grant of habeas corpus was reversed as well.

There is much left unanswered. Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion, gets more to the point about the prosecution maintaining conflicting positions, but fails to draw a solid conclusion, closing with: "If a due process violation is found in the State's maintenance of such inconsistent positions, there will be remedial questions. May the death sentence stand if the State declines to repudiate its inconsistent position in the codefendant's case? Would it be sufficient simply to reexamine the original sentence and if so, which party should have the burden of persuasion? If more would be required, would [an entirely new] sentencing hearing suffice?" Another concurring opinion by Justice Thomas (with whom Justice Scalia joins) states very plainly that "this Court has never hinted, much less held, that the Due Process Clause prevents a State from prosecuting defendants based on inconsistent theories."