Racism in Jury Selection: When Enough is Enough

Johnson v. California

In this case a black man, Johnson, is appealing his conviction for second degree murder because the prosecution used their peremptory challenges to remove all black jury members. When juries are chosen a prospective juror may be removed either 'for cause' or by one of either lawyer's peremptory challenges, which require no reason or explanation. In this case of 43 prospective jurors, 3 were black. After the prosecutor used his challenges to remove the first two jurors the defense objected, but the judge ruled that the defense had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and did not ask the prosecution for an explanation. After the third and final black juror was removed the defense objected again, but the court held that there were possible explanations other than discrimination (equivocal answers on a questionnaire). The question here is whether the standard of "strong likelihood" or "enough evidence to permit the inference" should be used to make a prima facie case for discrimination, the first essentially amounting to 51% conclusive, and the second meaning simply that there is reason to believe that discrimination took place.

Here the Court lays out exactly how objections for discrimination to peremptory challenges should work. "First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case 'by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the 'burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. Third, '[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.' " The Court found that California's requirement of a "strong likelihood" was unduly burdensome, and that rather "a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson'’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred."

Justice Thomas dissented because Batson (the precedent that this is whole case is set on) declined "to formulate particular procedures to be followed" in cases such as this, and gave the States the power to experiment (subject to the minimum of 14th Amendment "equal protection" requirements) with their own methods and interpretation, a framework with which this case complies in JusticeThomas' opinion.