Does the ADA Apply to Foreign Ships

Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.

In this case Norwegian Cruise Line is being sued for noncompliance under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Title III of the ADA requires that certain reasonable accommodations be made for disabled persons such as handicapped accessible rooms, railings, etc. The question is whether or not Title III of the ADA applies to a foreign-flag ship (a ship that is for the most part outside the jurisdiction of the United States).

The courts presume that Congress does not pass laws that apply extraterritorially unless those laws have a clear statement demonstrating Congress' intent otherwise. In this case Congress defined places of "public accommodation" and "specific public transportation"(where Title III applies) by listing things like hotels and restaurants but not cruise ships. In this case the majority found that cruise ships clearly fit within this definition, considering that they are little more than floating hotels with restaurants. The courts have also held that "general statutes are presumed to apply to conduct that takes place aboard a foreign-flag vessel in United States territory if the interests of the United States or its citizens, rather than interests internal to the ship, are at stake." The majority here finds that Title III is applicable to foreign-flagged cruise ships, but insofar as Title III affects the internal order of the ship, a clear Congressional statement of intent would be necessary. Furthermore, where Title III would conflict with international law, its requirements would not be "readily achievable" (the limit of reasonableness under Title III) and would thus not be required.

Justice Thomas' opinion states that the clear statement requirement applies to all structural changes to a ship that Title III would require, and that this clear statement requirement would apply as soon as conflict with international law was possible rather than certain. Justice Thomas also disagrees with the majority's division of the statute because whatever use the court's rules are to determine Congressional intent, "they are useless when modified in ways that Congress could never have imagined." Finally, Thomas argues that his conclusion follows because he never agreed with Clark v. Martinez, which states that the "lowest common denominator" of a law must govern, while the majority relies on it to distinguish classes of application of Title III (one class being where the ship's internal order is affected, and another where it is not).

The dissent interprets Title III to more broadly affect the internal order of the ship, and sees
the purpose of the clear statement requirement to be the avoidance of "casually subjecting ocean going vessels to laws that pose obvious risks of conflict with the laws of the ship‚’s flag state, the laws of other nations, and international obligations to which the vessels are subject." The dissent takes Justice Thomas' opinion that once this conflict is possible, a clear statement of Congress' intent that the law apply is required. The minority also states that the question of Congress' intent must be applied to Title III as a whole, and that "to believe that there was any such intent section-by-section and paragraph-by-paragraph is delusional."