No Generalized Standing to Sue Under Elections Clause

Lance v. Coffman

In 2000 the state of Colorado was unable to pass a redistricting plan, so the courts of that state crafted one. The Elections Clause of the Constitution provides that the “Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” When the Colorado State Assembly managed to pass a redistricting plan in 2003 the Colorado Attorney General argued, and the Colorado Supreme Court agreed, that its implementation would violate the clause of the Colorado Constitution providing that redistricting should only take place once every 10 years, and that the State Supreme Court’s plan was as binding as if it had originated in the State Legislature.

The Court already found last February (in another per curium opinion) that federal courts were not barred from hearing the case under the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine, which reserves final state court judgments for the Supreme Court unless “(1) ‘the party against whom the doctrine is invoked must have actually been a party to the prior state-court judgment or have been in privity with such a party’; (2) ‘the claim raised in the federal suit must have actually been raised or inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment’; and (3) ‘the federal claim must not be parallel to the state-court claim.’” The decision was based on reversing the lower court’s decision that the plaintiffs satisfied the first criteria through their associative interest in the case, arguably conflating the first criteria with general preclusion issues. This time, on remand, the lower court held that the suit was barred by issue preclusion because the plaintiffs “stand in privity with the Secretary of State and the General Assembly,” who lost before the Colorado Supreme Court.

The Court skips right over any discussion of general preclusion, and goes straight to standing, an issue addressed in a concurring opinion. Courts must first address jurisdiction, including standing, which in turn requires injury in fact, causation, and redressability. To have standing a plaintiff must have more than “a general interest common to all members of the public.” “Refusing to entertain generalized grievances ensures that ‘there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review’ in a particular case, and it helps guarantee that courts fashion remedies ‘no broader than required by the precise facts to which the court’s ruling would be applied.’”

In this case “the only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.” The Court points out that its previous cases construing the term “Legislature” were brought by a “relator” on behalf of the State, so standing was not an issue.