Exhaustion Limits in Prisoners' Habeas Petitions

Jones v. Bock

A Roberts opinion:

Jones suffered an injury while in custody and was forced to do work that aggravated that injury. He sued for deliberate indifference but failed to attach the record of his grievance proceedings. Williams objected to denial of a medical procedure on the basis that it was not worth the risk. During the grievance process Williams failed to name any of the people in his later suit in his grievance proceedings. Walton was subjected to the sanction of only receiving food and paperwork via the upper slot of his cell (?) and alleges racial discrimination based on the disparity of his punishment with that of other inmates. Walton failed to name any of the people in his later suit in his grievance proceedings.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) mandates early judicial screening of prisoner complaints and requires prisoners to exhaust grievance procedures before filing suit. The Sixth Circuit held that this requires allegation and demonstration of exhaustion, permits suit only against defendants identified in the grievance procedures, and requires that an entire action be dismissed if exhaustion is incomplete as to any claim.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure FRCP 8(a) requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim,” and courts have traditionally treated exhaustion requirements as an affirmative defense. The Court has been hostile to “heightened pleading requirements.” The rejects the argument that the early judicial screening requirement evidenced a divergence from traditional rules based on the fact that the various increasingly rigorous screening requirements in the PLRA was put in place before that act, and before any suggestion of an exhaustion requirement. Other theories fail to effectively demonstrate Congress’ intent to make exhaustion a pleading requirement instead of an affirmative defense. “’Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest,’ the judge’s job is to construe the statute—not make it better.” (Frankfurter).

As to the “name all defendants rule,” nothing of the sort appears in the PLRA and the precedent holding that the PLRA requires proper exhaustion (compliance with both PLRA and grievance process rules themselves) did not cut the pleading off at stage I of the grievance process. There is no discussion of a limiting principle on the grievance process, but the opinion obliquely suggests that it must further the purpose of the PLRA – effectively addressing problems before they reach the courts (ie. not surreptitiously quashing them).

Finally, the rule that dismissal is proper if even one claim is not properly exhausted is based on the use of the word “action” instead of “claim” in the PLRA formulation that “no action shall be brought.” This argument, though valid textually, is dismissed as against common usage in law (citing, among others, Exxon v. Allapath) and traditional practice of taking the good and leaving the bad. The allusion to the total exhaustion requirement in habeas cases is misplaced, as that requirement is based on “comity and federalism,” not statutory construction. Policies are rejected and anomalous results of construction in one direction are countered with equally anomalous results of construction in the other direction (eg. inmates might not be deterred by the requirement but rather file many suits to avoid tainting).