File Your 1983 Actions With Reckless Abandon

Wallace v. Kato

Handy was picked up for a shooting death and signed a confession which he later attempted to suppress as the product of an unlawful arrest. He successfully argued on appeal that (1) his voluntary accompaniment to the police station escalated to an arrest before there was probable cause, and (2) that the unlawful arrest was not sufficiently attenuated to allow the evidence to be admitted. Handy then filed a §1983 (civil rights violation) suit for damages for his unlawful arrest which was held to be time barred on the theory that his cause of action accrued at the time of his arrest and not at the time that his conviction was set aside.

Federal law looks to state law to determine the statute of limitations for personal-injury torts which, under Illinois law, is two years. The date from which that period begins to run in a §1983 action, however, is a matter of federal law, conforming in general to common-law tort principles. Therefore, the standard rule applies that accrual occurs “when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action,’” that is, “when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.”

Common law treats false arrest and false imprisonment differently, perhaps on the basis that the victim may not be able to sue while he is imprisoned. Limitations begin to run when the false imprisonment ends. False imprisonment ends once the victim begins to be held legally (ie. issuance of process). Handy argues that his illegal detention tainted his later, lawful, detention. To whatever extent the Court is willing to entertain this argument (not much) it argues that this could only apply to damage calculation and not useful to determine the beginning of accrual.

Once Handy was processed his detention was no longer unlawful and the previous unlawful detention becomes part of the damages in malicious prosecution, which remedies only the wrongful institution of legal process. Handy could have sued for false arrest on the first day of his incarceration, and the statute of limitation s began to run when he appeared before a magistrate.

Under Heck v. Humphrey, malicious prosecution requires “favorable termination of criminal proceedings” in order to prevent civil tort actions from becoming a vehicle for challenging outstanding criminal judgments. The Court assumes that this would apply to the commencement of the statute of limitations. In this case, however, there was only “an anticipated future conviction.” Courts will stay a preemptive civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of such a case has ended. §1983 actions, however, sometimes accrue before a conviction is set aside, leaving the time between conviction and “favorable termination of criminal proceedings” during which Heck bars the action, but the statute of limitations has already begun to run. Worse yet, no state law provides for tolling that period in any similar circumstance, and (as mentioned above) federal law looks to state law to determine the statute of limitations.

The Court would not adopt a federal tolling rule because no one would know whether it would apply until a §1983 action was filed, leaving it to the defendant’s discretion to create the circumstances that result in tolling, and to spring a §1983 action on the unwitting State. Nor does the Court accept the idea that equitable tolling should be employed to prevent a criminal defendant from having to split his attention between his criminal and civil cases. In any case, some defendants will surely file §1983 actions before being convicted, so whatever prudential problems there may be with the majority’s rule will exist even if another rule is adopted. The Court also argues against Justice Stevens, saying that any rule based on the petitioner’s opportunity to file a habeas action is unduly prospective and indeterminate. In pure unabashed dicta the Court asserts if the petitioner’s §1983 action were dismissed, and Heck later prevented him from refilling then Heck would directly violate the intent of §1983, implying that courts should not allow this to happen.

Justices Stevens and Souter would hold that whereas Heck disabled civil actions in favor of habeas corpus actions, since because, under Stone v. Powell, no habeas action was available to Handy, the Heck principle does not apply. Stevens accuses the majority of pointing to aberrant examples when suggesting that federal habeas petitioners sometimes succeed in arguing that Stone does not apply.

Justices Breyer and Ginsburg would employ “equitable tolling” to toll the statute of limitations while a petitioner is fighting the criminal charges against him. The majority’s method, he argues, would require criminal defendants to file all §1983 actions early, even if they would ostensibly be barred by the Heck rule, and those actions would have to consider matters being litigated elsewhere for a court to determine whether to issue a stay. Res Judicata could give these premature decisions long lasting effect, a fact that might entice courts to let the matters linger. The rule would be fair, support the purpose of §1983, and provide all of the benefits of a federal rule on the matter. Finally, there is no notice problem because the rule would only apply where the basis for the later §1983 actions were being litigated in state court, providing the state with notice of the petitioner’s claims.

It’s long, but the first part of the opinion is metaphysics and the second is advanced criminal procedure. I hope this makes sense when I come back to read it.