Boring: How Does the AEDPA Limit Rule 60(b) Motions

Gonzalez v. Crosby

The many time limits during which a prisoner may file a petition for postconviction relief are "tolled" during "pendency of 'properly filed' applications only," meaning that that time period is not counted toward the prisoner’s time limitation. Aurelio Gonzales filed two petitions claiming that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After loosing both petitions (his second being dismissed as procedurally barred), and his limitation period having run out, the Supreme Court decided Artuz v. Bennett, holding that "an application for state postconviction relief can be 'properly filed' even if the state courts dismiss it as procedurally barred." The question here is whether Mr. Gonzales' second petition is "properly filed" which would in turn required that his limitation period be tolled during its pendency.

Rule 60(b) which governs certain petitions is superseded by the AEDPA, which requires three things of "second or successive petitions." 1) "Any claim that has already been adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed" 2) Any claim that has not must be dismissed unless it relies on A) a new and retroactive rule or B) new facts showing a high probability of actual innocence, and 3) the court of appeals must determine that it "presents a claim not previously raised" that meets "new-rule or actual-innocence provisions." The question in this case thus becomes whether these requirements limit rule 60(b).

The Court first decides that rule 60(b) motions, due to their purpose and character, are Habeas motions and are subject to the same rules as such. At this point, if Mr. Gonzales' second petition did in fact raise a claim (revisiting the merits of a court's decision), it would be limited by the AEDPA. However, if it merely "attacks, not the substance of the federal court's resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal Habeas proceedings." The Court then finds that Mr. Gonzales' second petition meets the second definition. So Mr. Gonzales wins right? Nope. The Court then asserts that Mr. Gonzales' petition did not satisfy the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement of rule 60(b) because the alternate interpretation of successive appeals in Artuz did not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance.

The dissent argues that the merits of the petition were not before the Court, and the majority therefore had no right to rule on them. The dissent also argues that the discussion of ruling on the merits of the petition by the majority is insufficient, and questions whether the Artuz ruling could not be considered an "extraordinary circumstance" in this case, especially considering other contributing factors.