How Much Latitude do States Retain in Defining the Insanity Defense?

Clark v. Arizona

Eric Clark shot an officer when he was pulled over for suspicious activity and fled on foot. He was found mentally incompetent to stand trial, but after two years in a state hospital he was deemed competent. Clark relied on his undisputed paranoid schizophrenia to deny that he had specific intent to shoot a law enforcement officer, or knowledge that he was doing so, as the statue requires. The prosecution pointed out that in pulling over Clark had recognized the symbol of police authority and that he had made statements in the weeks prior that he wanted to kill police officers. This case considers whether due process prohibits Arizona from using an inanity test solely based on the capacity to tell right from wrong (leaving out mental disease or defect) or by prohibiting defense evidence of mental disease, short of insanity, bearing on the defendant’s mens rea.

Clark argues that the elimination of the reference to the nature and quality of the act from the M’Nauthten test (generally, ‘if by reason of a diseased condition of the mind the defendant is unable to (a) understand the nature and quality of his act (cognitive incapacity); or (b) lacked the capacity to distinguish right from wrong(moral incapacity)) “offends [a] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental” (test for incorporating protection into the Due Process Clause). A third test, volitional incapacity (“irresistible-impule”), comes from English common law and a fourth (“product-of-mental-illness”) is employed in one form or another in fourteen jurisdictions along with moral incpacity (following the ALI Model Penal Code). Seventeen States and the Federal Government use a “recognizable version” of the M’Naughen test (both cognitive and moral incapacity); one state uses only the cognitive capacity portion, ten have adopted moral incapacity alone, and three combing the full M’Naughen test with the volitional capacity test. Only New Hampsire uses the product-of-metal-illness alone. Additionally, some states use the Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Insanity verdict or Guilty but Mentally Ill, and four States have no insanity defense, but allow considerations of mental illness to bear on the ability to form the requisite mens rea. These observations, along with the Court’s argument that it is generally accepted that cognitive incapacity is sufficient (but not necessary) to show moral incapacity bring the Court to the conclusion that the abridgment of the M’Naughten rule was constitutional.

The second issue derives from the Arizona court’s rule, at the time on the issue of battered women’s syndrome, that evidence of mental incapacity owing to mental disease or defect is admissible, but cannot be considered on the element of mens rea. As a background the Court overviews types of evidence. “Observational evidence” might come from those who were familiar with Clark, or professionals who observed him. “Mental-disease evidence” is generally opinion evidence from experts. Then there is “capacity evidence,” from experts regarding the specific nature of Clark’s mental state. These classifications are very broad and general. The Court reads the Arizona rule, from Mott, to pertain only to the second two types of evidence. The majority does not believe that Clark objected to the application of Mott, or at least did not frame such an objection to the Arizona court, and thus only considers the objections to the law based on its exclusion of professional evidence.

All defendants are presumed innocent until the government proves otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, all defendants are presumed mentally competent until the defendant proves otherwise, though the standard of proof is flexible. Where a State allows mental disease to be considered on par with other evidence when deciding whether the prosecution has proven mens rea “the strength of the presumption of sanity is no greater than the strength of the evidence of abnormal mental state required to raise reasonable doubt.” This would effectively do away with the requirement that the defense prove insanity (by whatever standard), by granting a victory to the defense if it could make a showing that need only be reasonable.

A problem arises. “If the same evidence that affirmatively shows that he was not guilty by reason of insanity (or “guilty-but-mentally-insane” under Arizona law …) also shows it was at least doubtful that he could form mens rea, then he should not have been found guilty in the first place. There must be a reason for limiting such evidence to the insanity issue. The Court cites the evolving nature of scientific knowledge and understanding, the potential of such evidence to mislead juries, and the effect that theoretical disagreement between experts can have on juries.

The dissent attacks the Court’s division of evidence into three categories. As an example of the way this formula is unworkable the dissent considers the fact that the defendant was charged with luring the police officer to the scene by playing the radio very loud and driving in circles. The dissent points out that paranoid schizophrenics often have auditory hallucinations, and play music very loud in order to drown them out. If this is the case, and if it were entered with only the observational evidence, excluding the expert evidence portion, the evidence would be quite distorted. Ultimately, the dissent argues, “knowledge requires cognition, and cognition can be affected by schizophrenia.” The three categories substantially overlap.

Additionally, the dissent argues that the ambiguities in the defense’s argument should not be construed to deny review of the fundamental question, and the ambiguities cited by the majority are illusory. Clark’s counsel had no reason to believe that greater specificity was needed since the tripartite formula was devised in the Court itself. Also since Clark raised the claim in a broad sense he is entitled to support it with whatever arguments he pleases. “A State’s legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case.” The dissent mainly objects to what it perceives as an arbitrary or disproportionate limitation on the defense’s ability to counter a necessary component of the charge. As far as the jury is concerned, “the difficulty of resolving a factual issue, [does] not present a sufficient reason to take evidence away from the jury even when it is crucial for the defense.” Additionally, the shift in burden may be appropriate in terms of an insanity defense, but not in terms of a defense to an element of the charge.

The rule, the dissent says, is also irrational. If Clark had testified that he lacked the requisite mens rea because he believed the officer to be an alien the State could not disallow the defense, and if it were allowed the rule would deny Clark the ability to support the assertion.