EPA Preempting State Law?
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC
29 peanut farmers are appealing a decision against them in a case where they alleged that Dow Agrosciences sold them a pesticide named “Strongarm” with a label that indicated it should be used wherever peanuts are grown. This was also expressed to the farmers verbally. In applying with the EPA for a label Dow learned that their pesticide was not safe anywhere where the Ph level of the soil was over 7.0. The soil in Texas
The lower court ruled in favor of Dow on claims of strict liability, negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) because these claims were pre-empted by the EPA’s statute “that States ‘shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.’” The lower court also held that because “oral statements by Dow’s agents… did not differ from statements made on the product’s label, success on those claims would give Dow a “strong incentive” to change its label,” which was pre-empted by the EPA’s statute. Similarly, the lower court saw the strict liability claim as a “’disguised’ failure-to-warn claim” which would also be pre-empted.
The Supreme Court here decided that mere motivation to change the packaging was not sufficiently a “requirement,” so the claims against Dow were not preemted. The Court recognized that “requirements” “[reach] beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations,” to include common-law duties, but held that these duties must be a requirement “for labeling or packaging,” and must impose a labeling or packaging requirement “in addition to or different from those required under [the EPA statute].”
The majority found that the fraud and negligent-failure-to-warn claims, since they are premised on common-law rules, qualify as “requirements for labeling or packaging,” but that “a state-law labeling requirement is not pre-empted by [the EPA statute] if it is equivalent to, and fully consistent with… [federal] misbranding provisions.” The Court then left it to the lower courts to determine if these common-law rules are consistent with the Federal statute. The majority also explained that while failing Congress’ “clear and manifest intent” to supplant state federal law is assumed not to do so, “a state-law labeling requirement must in fact be equivalent to [its federal counterpart] in order to survive pre-emption.”
The opinion concurring in judgment and dissenting in part argued that the breach of warranty claim, and the claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) should also be remanded.
The lower court ruled in favor of Dow on claims of strict liability, negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) because these claims were pre-empted by the EPA’s statute “that States ‘shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.’” The lower court also held that because “oral statements by Dow’s agents… did not differ from statements made on the product’s label, success on those claims would give Dow a “strong incentive” to change its label,” which was pre-empted by the EPA’s statute. Similarly, the lower court saw the strict liability claim as a “’disguised’ failure-to-warn claim” which would also be pre-empted.
The Supreme Court here decided that mere motivation to change the packaging was not sufficiently a “requirement,” so the claims against Dow were not preemted. The Court recognized that “requirements” “[reach] beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations,” to include common-law duties, but held that these duties must be a requirement “for labeling or packaging,” and must impose a labeling or packaging requirement “in addition to or different from those required under [the EPA statute].”
The majority found that the fraud and negligent-failure-to-warn claims, since they are premised on common-law rules, qualify as “requirements for labeling or packaging,” but that “a state-law labeling requirement is not pre-empted by [the EPA statute] if it is equivalent to, and fully consistent with… [federal] misbranding provisions.” The Court then left it to the lower courts to determine if these common-law rules are consistent with the Federal statute. The majority also explained that while failing Congress’ “clear and manifest intent” to supplant state federal law is assumed not to do so, “a state-law labeling requirement must in fact be equivalent to [its federal counterpart] in order to survive pre-emption.”
The opinion concurring in judgment and dissenting in part argued that the breach of warranty claim, and the claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) should also be remanded.
posted by Oliver W. Jones @ 6:07 PM
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